Tuesday, March 31, 2009
The Fed's new role: the Mexico variation...
Chapter 9...
Jefferson County, Alabama is facing a different problem. The local government bought interest rate swaps which "broke down" last year (presumably, Lehman Brothers was the counterparty), leaving Jefferson County with US$3.2 billion in debt it can't pay and can't refinance. If Jefferson County opts for Chapter 9, it will test whether bonded debt, like labor contracts, can be re-structured when a local government files for bankruptcy. Alabama's governor has written to Treasury and the Fed asking for their help in stretching out the debt in an effort to avoid repudiating it.
State governments in the US defaulted on debt in the mid-nineteenth century, to the chagrin of their foreign creditors. If the financial crisis isn't contained and if the economy doesn't bottom out, it's conceivable that Vallejo won't be the only city to seek Chapter 9 protection.
Friday, March 27, 2009
Financial crisis: how we got here...
The explanation focuses on mortgages. Be sure to add credit card debt, car loans, etc. to get a full picture of the magnitude of the debacle.
http://www.crisisofcredit.com/
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
US - Mexico relations
Let's hope, too, that the US finally puts a stop to the arms sales that are fuelling the narco-violence. According to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,, Firearms and Explosives, a whopping 90% of the guns the Mexican drug cartels use came from the US.
Another mutually beneficial topic to put on the bilateral agenda would be integration of health care in the two countries.
Monday, March 23, 2009
The new wisdom...
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2009/moneymag/0903/gallery.financial_rules.moneymag/index.html
An interesting -- and overlooked -- fact about housing prices in the US... A 2005 analysis by Yale University economist Robert Shiller (of the Case Shiller index) found that real estate appreciation in real (after inflation) terms has been "unimpressive" since 1890 with two spectacular exceptions. The first was the post-World War II boom and the second began in 1998. Guess we know when it ended...
Sunday, March 8, 2009
Secrets are hard to keep...
Meanwhile, a list "from a reliable source" has been leaked to Fortune magazine. The names are:
Société Générale (France)
Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500)
Merrill Lynch International
Deutsche Bank (Germany)
Calyon, Crédit Agricole (France)
UBS (Switzerland)
Barclays (England)
Coral Purchasing, DZ Bank (Germany)
Bank of Montreal (Canada)
Rabobank (the Netherlands)
Royal Bank of Scotland
Bank of America
Wachovia
HSBC (England)
Barclays Global Investors
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Relative values...
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Bernanke on AIG...
“If there is a single episode in this entire 18 months that has made me more angry, I can’t think of one." AIG “exploited a huge gap” in the regulatory system: it became a “hedge fund, basically, that was attached to a large and stable insurance company” and made “huge numbers of irresponsible bets.”
Bernanke, a Republican appointed by former President Bush, tacitly endorsed a Keynesian approach: lots of government spending with the trillion dollar deficits that imples are necessary to get through the economic crisis.
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
A liquidity or a solvency problem?
Calculated Risk has this to say about the Treasury's latest plan to deal with financial institutions' toxic assets, by making low interest, non-recourse loans to private investors to buy bad assets:
"By offering low interest non-recourse loans, these public-private entities can pay a higher than market price for the toxic assets (since there is no downside risk). This amounts to a direct subsidy from the taxpayers to the banks. It is amazing how many different ways they’ve tried to recycle the same bad idea."
And from Tim Duy's Fed Watch:
"For Bernanke and Geithner, there are no bad assets. Only misunderstood assets."
If, as increasingly seems to be the case, for some financial institutions this is a solvency, not a liquidity problem, the solution is not about overpaying for toxic assets.